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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, | 
| APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee, | 
I District Court 051902267 
vs. | 
I Appellate Court 20070057 
MARTIN E. | 
HERNANDEZ-CAMACHO | 
Defendant/Appellant. | 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Was Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's right to effective assistance of counsel violated 
due to his trial counsel's failure to present an entrapment defense? 
iv 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time 
on appeal presents a question of law," which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. 
Clark, 2004 UT 25,1f 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The following statute and constitutional provision will be determinative of the 
issue on appeal: 
United States Constitution Amendment 6 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
Utah Code Annotated S 58-37-8 
Attached hereto as Addendum A 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 4, 2005, officers with the Weber County Strike Force arranged 
through a confidential informant to meet Sylvester Scott's purported supplier of crack 
cocaine, in order for them to complete a two-ounce purchase. In what is known as a RIP, 
Officer Shawn Grogan prearranged the meeting between Sylvester Scott and his supplier, 
to take place at a Sinclair Station in West Ogden, Utah. The Defendant was arrested in 
the parking lot after crack cocaine was found in his vehicle. The Defendant was charged 
with possession with intent to distribute within a thousand feet of a drug free zone, to wit-
a public parking lot, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(viii). On August 29, 
2006, the Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged. On December 7, 2006, the 
Defendant was committed to the Utah State Prison for a term of not less than five (5) 
years, no more than life. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about May 4, 2005, officers with the Weber County Strike Force arranged 
through Sylvester Scott to meet his purported supplier of crack cocaine, in order for them 
to complete a two-ounce purchase. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 82,11. 14-23), 
Sylvester Scott is a known crack cocaine dealer who had recently been arrested and 
charged for drug offenses. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 75,11. 20 - pp. 76,11. 10.) 
In what is known as a RIP, Officer Shawn Grogan prearranged the meeting between 
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Sylvester Scott and his supplier. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 88,11. 22 - pp. 89,11. 
7). 
After learning that Sylvester Scott had arranged for the meeting with his supplier 
to occur at a residence, Officer Grogan informed Sylvester Scott that he did not want to 
involve anybody at the residence and asked that it be set for another location. (Jury Trial 
Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 75,11. 8-20). When Sylvester Scott proposed the Sinclair Station 
in West Ogden, Utah, Officer Grogan approved this location. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 
1, pp. 88,11. 22 - pp. 89,11. 1). The meeting between Sylvester Scott and his purported 
supplier was to occur on May 4, 2005. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 82,11. 14-23). 
After contacting Mr. Hernandez-Camacho initially to arrange for a drug purchase, 
Sylvester Scott again contacted Mr. Hernandez-Camacho while he was enroute to the 
residence, and told Mr. Hernandez-Camacho to meet him at the Sinclair Station instead. 
(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 77,11. 12-25). As arranged by Officer Grogan, 
Sylvester Scott was to meet Mr. Hernandez-Camacho at the Sinclair Station, and then 
have Mr. Hernandez-Camacho follow him to another location to complete the 
transaction. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 76,11. 11-15). In exchange for his 
cooperation with the police, Sylvester Scott received a reduction of time in his sentence 
for the drug offenses. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 78,11. 6-10). 
Before Mr. Hernandez-Camacho arrived, Officer Grogan positioned agents in the 
parking lot of the Sinclair Station to observe the meeting between Sylvester Scott and his 
purported supplier. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 91,11. 11 - p p . 92,11. 8). Mr. 
Hernandez-Camacho arrived at the Sinclair Station and parked next to Sylvester Scott. 
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(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 97, 11. 25 - pp. 98,11. 4). When Mr. Hernandez-
Camacho exited his vehicle, Sylvester Scott told him "to just follow me to my spot." 
(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 81,11. 9-11). Sylvester Scott then began to leave the 
Sinclair Station, and as Mr. Hernandez-Camacho was also leaving the Sinclair Station, 
the agents and officers blocked in the vehicle. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 100,11. 1 
-pp. 101,11. 4). The agents searched Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's vehicle, found crack 
cocaine, and placed Mr. Hernandez-Camacho under arrest. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, 
pp. 104, U. 19-pp. 105,11.25). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In arranging for Sylvester Scott to meet his purported supplier and arrange for a 
drug purchase, the police chose the location of the Sinclair Station, ensuring that Mr. 
Hernandez-Camacho's offense would be enhanced from a second degree felony to a first 
degree felony. Before Mr. Hernandez-Camacho and Sylvester Scott completed any drug 
transaction or left the public parking lot to find another location to complete the drug 
transaction, the police arrested Mr. Hernandez-Camacho to further ensure that his offense 
and sentence would be enhanced. 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's trial counsel failed to present a sentencing entrapment 
by location defense to the jury, which would have allowed for Mr. Hernandez-Camacho 
to be convicted of a second degree felony instead of a first degree felony. There is a 
reasonable probability that this defense would have been accepted where police exercised 
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unfettered discretion in the investigation, using that discretion to orchestrate the crime to 
occur in such a manner that the Appellant would be subject to the longest possible prison 
term. Because of the failure to present the entrapment defense to the jury, Mr. 
Hemandez-Camacho received a sentence for up to life, instead of up to 15 years in 
prison. 
ix 
ARGUMENT 
a. MR. HERNANDEZ-CAMACHO WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE HIS COUNSEL DID NOT 
PRESENT AN ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE. 
Under Utah law, a defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel when 
counsel fails to raise a valid defense, and it is reasonably probable that but for the 
attorney's failure, the outcome would have been different. As explained by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, the right to counsel embodied in the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a "right to the effective assistance 
of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984). To demonstrate ineffective representation, a defendant must show: (1) 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists 
that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable 
outcome at trial." State v. Hales 2007 UT 14 [^68, 152 P.3d 321. 
1. Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's Counsel Was Objectively 
Deficient 
It is well-established that defendants convicted of distributing, possessing, or 
manufacturing controlled substances are subject to enhanced penalties if their offense 
occurred within 1000 feet of certain public places, such as schools or public parking lots. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (1996); State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 502-05 (Utah 
1989); State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030 1035 (Utah App.1994); State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 
1 
54, 58-61 (Utah App.1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The State must 
prove those additional facts to the trier of fact who finds defendants guilty of the 
predicate crime. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2415, 
91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986)("the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged")(quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 
1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). A valid defense negates an element of the crime or 
an enhancement. State v. Galvin, 514 A.2d 705, 707 (Vt. 1986)(defense of voluntary 
intoxication negates enhancement for assaulting police officer). 
The Sixth Amendment does not require an attorney to raise every conceivable 
defense, make every conceivable argument, or file every conceivable motion. Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Even a tactical decision not to make a particular 
argument must be reasonable. Hales, 2007 UT 14, f73. The Sixth Amendment does 
require that when a potentially valid defense has a reasonable probability of dramatically 
reducing a defendant's sentence, failure to raise the defense is objectively deficient. Id. 
As discussed infra, a potentially valid entrapment defense was available, but was never 
raised by Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's attorney. 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho was arrested subsequent to a RIP investigation, and was 
then charged and convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 58-38-8(l)(a)(iii), possession 
of a controlled or counterfeit substance with the intent to distribute. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 58-37-8, if the controlled or counterfeit substance is classified in 
Schedule II, the offense is a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(b)(i). 
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Mr. Hernandez-Camacho was charged and convicted of a first degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(4) because the offense occurred in a public parking lot. 
This enhancement increased the maximum possible sentence from 15 years to life in 
prison. See Utah Code Annotated. 76-3-203. 
Utah applies an objective test, focusing solely on the police conduct and whether 
the conduct creates or manufactures crimes, which is the minority rule. Mr. Hernandez-
Camacho's trial counsel did not present an entrapment by location defense to the 
sentencing enhancement. Mr. Hernandez-Camacho seeks relief from this Court to cure 
trial counsel's deficiency by granting a new trial. 
2. But For Counsel's Deficient Performance, There Is A 
Reasonable Probability That Appellant Would Have 
Received A More Favorable Outcome, 
The second prong of Strickland v. Washington is satisfied because the police 
conduct fell outside standards of proper governmental power, and there was a reasonable 
probability that if counsel had raised the entrapment defense the outcome would have 
been more favorable. 
Entrapment occurs when the government creates or manufactures a crime. Utah 
has adopted an objective standard for entrapment claims. State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 
(Utah Ct.App.1995). Utah's entrapment statute provides: 
"Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a 
substar.'hl risk that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready 
to commit it." 
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Utah Code Ann.. § 76-2-303. "Under the objective view of entrapment, the focus is not 
on the propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police 
conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards . . . for the proper use of 
governmental power." State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979); see also State v. 
Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1984); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317-18 (Utah 
App.1987). Entrapment laws rest on the principle that "nothing can be more 
reprehensible than to induce the commission of crime for the purpose of apprehending 
and convicting the perpetrator." Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500-01. 
Entrapment implicates concerns that have always been central to ensuring due 
process of law, and "proper use of government power." Sherman v. United States, 356 
U.S. 369 (1958). Entrapment laws are intended to check the unfettered exercise of the 
State's police power over its citizens. Entrapment and due process each require that 
government adhere to its proper role and not abuse lawful power. Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 435, 444 (1932). While in some cases, entrapment may be so extreme as 
to present a constitutional violation, legislatively enacted entrapment statutes further limit 
the exercise of police power. U.S. v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 378, 380 (C.A.N.J. 1978). 
Jurisdictions such as Utah, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Hawaii utilize the 
objective test for entrapment, prohibit various police behaviors present at the time of the 
illegal conduct that do not rise to the level of due process violations. See e.g. Taylor, 599 
P.2d at 500. Focusing on the police conduct in arranging and organizing the RIP 
investigation, Mr. Hemandez-Camacho was entrapped by location because the police 
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conduct induced the enhancement, and the government conduct closely mirrors conduct 
held to improper or unconstitutional in other circumstances. 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho was arrested at the Sinclair Station subsequent to a RIP 
arranged by the Weber County Strike Force. To investigate possible drug offenses, the 
Strike Force uses RIPs as investigational tools to identify and possibly arrest drug 
dealers. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 64,11. 16-25). A RIP is when an officer or an 
informant calls a drug dealer to arrange a purchase to draw them to a particular location. 
(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 64,11. 2-6). The purpose of the RIP is to have the drug 
dealer arrive at a particular location with drugs in order for the officers to make an arrest 
or at least to have cause to search them or their vehicle. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, 
pp. 64,11. 2-12). The RIP is "just a ruse to get that person to a location so they can be 
arrested with the drugs." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 65,11. 6-7). "Once they 
arrive, then they're arrested for the offense." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 65,11. 10-
12). Agent Hansen characterized a RIP as "a setup to identify a target and arrest him." 
(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 7,11. 9). 
Officer Grogan of the Weber County Strike Force used Sylvester Scott to arrange 
for a RIP with his purported drug supplier at the Sinclair Station. (Jury Trial Transcript, 
Vol. 1, pp. 88,11. 22 - pp. 89,11. 7). Sylvester Scott contacted his purported drug 
supplier, Mr. Hernandez-Camacho, to purchase drugs and arranged for them to meet at 
his residence. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 75,11. 1-13). After learning that 
Sylvester Scott had arranged for the meeting with his supplier to occur at a residence, 
Officer Grogan informed Sylvester Scott that he did not want to involve anybody at the 
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residence and asked that it be set for another location. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 
75,11. 8-20). Officer Grogan stated that, "initially when Mr. Scott called, there was a 
discussion about meeting at L.C. Watson's home...I told him that I didn't wanna do that, 
that you needed to find another location." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 88,11. 22-
25). When Sylvester Scott proposed the Sinclair Station in West Ogden, Utah, Officer 
Grogan approved this location. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 88,11. 22 - pp. 89,11. 
1). Once Officer Grogan decided that the location would be the Sinclair Station, he 
contacted other agents and held a debriefing. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 91,11. 11-
17). Officer Grogan contacted Agent Olsen to notify him "that they were gonna do a RIP 
... on an individual using a C.I." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 175,11. 22-24). 
Officer Grogan also contacted Agent Haney, "saying that he was going to do a RIP type 
of investigation at the Sinclair Station." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 16,11. 9-10). 
Agent Hansen was also contacted by Officer Grogan and told that there was going to be a 
RIP and to be out in the area. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 6,11. 13-17). Before the 
RIP at the Sinclair Station, Officer Grogan also held a debriefing with the purpose of 
informing the agents of the information known about the suspect, to predetermine the 
positions of the agents in and around the Sinclair Station, and to set up surveillance. 
(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 83,11. 21-25). Agent Haney attended the debriefing to 
learn "about what the operation was going to entail and what [the] assignment would be." 
(Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 16,11. 12-14). At this debriefing, it was arranged that 
once the suspect arrived at the Sinclair Station, Mr. Scott would tell him to follow him to 
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another location, which would serve as the signal that the individual was the purported 
supplier. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 91, 11. 23 - pp. 92,11. 2). 
Officer Grogan focused on controlling the environment at the Sinclair Station. He 
positioned certain agents within the Sinclair Station parking lot, and other agents in the 
area surrounding the Sinclair Station to observe the meeting between Sylvester Scott and 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 91,11. 16-23). Agent 
Johnson followed the directions of Officer Grogan because he "callfed] the shots and 
[made] the assignments." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 156,11. 11-18). Officer 
Grogan also made sure that the agents had both radios and cell phones in order to 
communicate with each other the entire time. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 95,11. 8-
13). 
Just prior to the meeting between Sylvester Scott and Mr. Hernandez-Camacho, 
Officer Grogan had the agents in their assigned positions at the Sinclair Station. (Jury 
Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 96,11. 5-11). The agents observed Mr. Hernandez-Camacho 
arrive in his vehicle and park next to Sylvester Scott's vehicle. (Jury Trial Transcript, 
Vol. 1, pp. 98,11. 5-10). When Mr. Hernandez-Camacho exited his vehicle, Sylvester 
Scott told him "to just follow me to my spot." (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 81,11. 9-
11). Sylvester Scott then began to leave the Sinclair Station, and as Mr. Hernandez-
Camacho was also leaving the Sinclair Station, the agents and officers blocked in the 
vehicle. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 100,11. 1 - p p . 101,11. 4). The agents 
searched Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's vehicle, found crack cocaine, and placed Mr. 
7 
Hernandez-Camacho under arrest. (Jury Trial Transcript, Vol.. 1, pp. 104,11. 19 - pp. 
105,11. 25). 
Officer Grogan organized the RIP in every detail. He chose the agents that would 
participate in the RIP. He decided how Sylvester Scott would give a signal to identify the 
suspect. He decided how the agents would be positioned to observe Sylvester Scott and 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho. He decided where the offense would occur, and where Mr. 
Hernandez-Camacho would be searched and arrested. 
This conduct and unfettered discretion of the police to arrange and then draw a 
purported drug dealer to a particular location should not be allowed. The police were 
permitted to determine Mr. Hernandez-Camacho's penalty and offense level because of 
the way they orchestrated the offense. In the present case, Officer Grogan was allowed to 
choose the Sinclair Station as the location of the offense, and chose to search and arrest 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho at the Sinclair Station. Because of Officer Grogan's decision to 
arrange the RIP in the Sinclair Station parking lot, Mr. Hernandez-Camacho was charged 
with a first degree felony instead of a second degree felony. 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court overturned the 
convictions of eight defendants because the vagrancy laws provided inadequate notice of 
what constituted legal conduct, and because the statute "encouragefd] arbitrary and 
erratic arrests and convictions." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161, 
92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). The Supreme Court has since noted the "more 
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the ... requirement that 
a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement" Kolender v. 
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Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)(internal quotation 
marks omitted). In this case law enforcement orchestrated the crime and chose the 
location that the crime would be carried out. As police in Papachristou exercised 
unfettered discretion in choosing whom to prosecute, so police here exercised unfettered 
discretion by deciding Mr. Hernandez-Camacho would receive a greater sentence. 
The ill effects of this unfettered discretion are demonstrated in another way by 
Utah's Shondel doctrine. The Shondel doctrine prevents a prosecutor from having the 
discretion of charging a higher penalty when a defendant's conduct constitutes two 
offenses with two different levels of offenses. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 
146 (1969). "Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all those who are 
similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written ... so that the exact 
same conduct is not subject to different penalties depending upon which of two statutory 
sections a prosecutor chooses to charge." State v. Bryan, 709 P .2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985). 
"The Shondel doctrine requires that when two different statutory provisions define the 
same offense, a defendant must be sentenced under the provision carrying the lesser 
penalty." State v. Green, 2000 UT App 33,^ f 6, 995 P.2d 1250; See State v. Shondel, 22 
Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969). 
Again, the entrapment defense does not require the same level of constitutional 
violation required by Papachristou or ShondeL The similarity between this case and 
those cases does demonstrates the same abuse of power the Utah and United States 
Supreme Court addressed in those cases. Appellant's counsel should not have permitted 
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such limitless power to go unchecked, and there is a reasonable probability that Appellant 
would have received a more favorable outcome had the defense been raised. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hernandez-Camacho was ineffectively represented by counsel at trial and 
there is a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable outcome at 
trial had the entrapment defense been presented to the jury. For these reasons, Mr. 
Hernandez-Camacho requests that this Court grant him a new trial. 
DATED: April 25,2007 ^ 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde 
Skordas 
^ca §. Hyde 
Counsel fohMartin E. Hernandez-Camacho 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 25th day of April, 2007,1 caused to be mailed via 
United States first-class mail, postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief to: 
Ryan Tenney 
Attorney Generals Office 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde 
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ADDENDA 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any provision of Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as 
listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second 
or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in 
Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the 
commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for 
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by 
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, 
or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, 
or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 
pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the amount 
is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under Subsection 
(l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
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(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with 
respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, 
and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation of 
Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any measurable amount of a 
controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury 
as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a 
controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is 
fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to 
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or 
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose 
his receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to 
alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or 
reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any 
of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any 
act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 
58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications 
under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
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(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools 
or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the 
act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or 
structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections 
(4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of a substance in 
violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a 
term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person 
is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection 
(2)(g). 
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to 
run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the mental state required 
for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the individual 
to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was 
unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or 
administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal under 
federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or persons 
produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie 
evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his professional practice only 
and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the 
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled 
substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of 
professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, as defined in Subsection 
58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection 
with the practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(w). 
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(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in Subsection 58-37-
4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona 
fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense under this Subsection 
(10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior to trial. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
(iii) The court rnay waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, if the prosecutor 
is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by a preponderance of the 
evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the charges. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held 
invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
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